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ABSTRACT
The development of a proficient staff at the Joint Level is primarily accomplished
through the use of computer aided exercises (CAXs). The primary purpose of these
exercises is to increase the readiness of the staff to perform actual missions from standing
up a Joint Task Force (JTF) to redeployment of the forces. A measure of the tasks
required of a staff is accomplished through a Mission Essential Task List from the
Universal Joint Task List (TJJTL). This document defines critical events and activities that
must be accomplished to achieve the desired mission goals. The measurement of that
performance from actual data from the computer model has been limited. This thesis
provides a methodology that assists in the evaluation of force protection. This
quantitative analysis can be provided quickly and concurrent to the exercise. Immediate
feedback helps the staff and commander to understand why an outcome happened through
linkage of UJTL tasks. This methodology was tested using the Joint Theater Level
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Training is the basic tool that a commander has to raise the proficiency of his or her
unit to prepare for its military mission. Training must be realistic and tough. At lower
levels of command, the primary method of training is the field training exercise (FTX)
For higher levels of command, FTXs are unrealistic in terms of money, amount of
subordinate troops required and land use. Beginning in the late 1980s, the Department of
Defense began investing heavily in incorporating computer models into large exercises
such as Return of Forces to Germany (REFORGER). This allowed the joint staffs to get
better training from the exercises because they could give orders, make plans and have
constructive feedback from a model without having actual troops on maneuvers.
This thesis develops a methodology for measuring the level of force protection
during a computer aided exercise. This methodology is demonstrated within the context
of a simulation using the Joint Theater Level Simulation. Measurement of a staffs
capability to perform mission essential tasks is critical for two reasons. The first is to
ensure that while training is being conducted, training resources are being used wisely and
that training objectives are being realized. The second reason is to assure that staff
proficiency is adequately measured to determine what tasks need further training. At the
current time the capability does not exist to quickly and concurrently analyze the
performance of a staff during a CAX.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Memorandum of Policy 26 (MOP 26) lays out the
responsibilities of a joint training requirement for the JCS, Joint Commanders-in-Chief
(CINCs), and the CINC's component staffs. In support of this, the JCS have developed
the Universal Joint Task List to provide the CINCs a methodology to construct a CINC's
Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL). The UJTL, as developed by Dynamics
Research Corporation (DRC) under the direction of the Joint Exercise and Training
Division of the J7, JCS, supports the Joint Training Manual (MCM 71-92). The UJTL
outlines in common language those essential tasks that a commander could possibly have
to carry out. They cover the entire spectrum of military operations at the strategic
(national and theater level), operational and tactical levels of war. At each level of war the
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tasks are broken down into supporting tasks, enabling tasks and further enabling tasks. A
commander then selects from the whole UJTL through an analysis of command guidance
and his mission based on his forces, their equipment and his area of responsibility. These
selected tasks combine to form his JMETL. The command assessment of the level of
training on those tasks then provides a tool to guide training.
Joint tasks describe the capabilities of our Armed Forces. They are assigned by
joint force commanders to be carried out by integrated Service components. Each task
then results in a condition and standard for performance; or in other words, a required
capability. Force protection is a required capability, and this thesis provides a better
insight on how that capability is being applied.
To measure force protection, this thesis uses firepower scores and force ratios to
evaluate force protection. Firepower scores can give the relative indications about the
strength of a unit, its combat effectiveness, and what it is capable of doing. By examining
the strength of a unit, when it was engaged or threatened to be engaged, and then the
firepower score over time, a decision maker is better able to understand why a unit may or
may not be able to function on a specified mission. Given that force protection is a
combat multiplier, leaders can better understand how their force protection plans bear on
the battle. This methodology has been demonstrated using the Joint Theater Level
Simulation (JTLS).
The strengths of the methodology are that it is uncomplicated, easy to produce and
can be quickly understood by the training audience. Simple file manipulation and the
graphical output can all be done through commercial spreadsheet packages. By
understanding the implications of force protection during and immediately after an
exercise provides a better training experience and enhances the readiness of a decision
maker and his or her staff.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Training is the basic tool that a commander has to raise the proficiency of his or her
unit to prepare for its military mission. Training must be realistic and tough. At lower
levels of command, the primary method of training is the field training exercise (FTX).
For higher levels of command, FTXs are unrealistic in terms of money, amount of
subordinate troops required and land use. Beginning in the late 1980s, the Department of
Defense began investing heavily in incorporating computer models into large exercises
such as Return of Forces to Germany (REFORGER). This allowed the joint staffs to get
better training from the exercises because they could give orders, make plans and have
constructive feedback from a model without having actual troops on maneuvers.
A. BACKGROUND
The evolution of these types of exercises has resulted in a command post exercise
that is supported by a computer model, or Computer Aided Exercise (CAX). Current
simulations within the joint arena are the Joint Theater Level Simulation (JTLS), the Joint
Aggregate Level Simulation Protocol Joint Training Confederation (ALSP-JTC) and the
Joint Conflict Model (JCM). Under current development is the Joint Simulations System
(JSIMS) which will expand the range of training to include operations other than war
added to the traditional combat roles.
These exercises involve gathering a large number of individuals that support a
training audience. The soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines that provide the individual
players in the simulation come from many different organizations. In most CAXs, the
players are brought together shortly before the exercise for quick training; they execute
the plan and then quickly disperse. There is often very little time for an after action review
that involves substantive quantitative data from the simulation. Also, there are few
indicators for a commander to determine whether the training is accomplishing its stated
goals while the training is occurring. Immediate feedback both during and after an
exercise would be of great benefit for all involved with the exercise.
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT
This thesis develops a methodology for measuring the level of force protection
during a computer aided exercise. This methodology is demonstrated within the context
of a simulation using the Joint Theater Level Simulation. Measurement of a staffs
capability to perform mission essential tasks is critical for two reasons. The first is to
ensure that while training is being conducted, training resources are being used wisely and
that training objectives are being realized. The second reason is to assure that staff
proficiency is adequately measured to determine what tasks need further training. At the
current time the capability does not exist to quickly and concurrently analyze the
performance of a staff during a CAX. This thesis augments previous research efforts by
US Army Captain Ray Combs and US Navy Lieutenant Chris Towery on different areas of
the Universal Joint Task List. It is part of an ongoing project, with methodologies for
different tasks being developed by other Naval Postgraduate School students. These
theses are listed in Appendix A.
C. THESIS STRUCTURE
Chapter II provides an overview of Force Protection and the Universal Joint Task
List Chapter III discusses descriptive performance measures and the methodology for
developing those measures. Chapter IV presents the application of the methodology to the
Joint Theater Level Simulation (JTLS) and results from a post exercise analysis. Chapter
V provides the conclusions and recommendations for future research.
n. OVERVIEW OF FORCE PROTECTION
Force protection is one of the most basic and intuitive responsibilities of command.
It is something for which every commander from the company to theater command has an
intimate and immediate concern. By ensuring adherence to the principles of force
protection, a commander makes his or her force as combat effective as possible.
Force protection is defined by the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms as
(A) security program designed to protect soldiers, civilian employees,
family members, facilities, and equipment, in all locations and situations,
accomplished through planned and integrated application of combating
terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective
services, and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other
security programs (151).
This chapter describes the basic tenants of force protection and its applicability to
the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL).
A. UNIVERSAL JOINT TASK LIST (UJTL)
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Memorandum of Policy 26 (MOP 26) lays out the
responsibilities of a joint training requirement for the JCS, Joint Commanders-in-Chief
(CINCs), and the CINCs component staffs. In support of this, the JCS have developed
the Universal Joint Task List to provide the CINCs a methodology to construct a CINCs
Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL). The JMETL allows a CINC to focus training
on those fundamental tasks that are required for mission success in his or her area of
responsibility. It also allows the commander to "institutionalize a requirements-based,
'train-to-task' joint training system" (UJTL, 1-1).
The UJTL, as developed by Dynamics Research Corporation (DRC) under the
direction of the Joint Exercise and Training Division of the J7, JCS, supports the Joint
Training Manual (MCM 71-92). The UJTL outlines in common language those essential
tasks that a commander could possibly have to carry out. They cover the entire spectrum
of military operations at the strategic (national and theater level), operational and tactical
levels of war. At each level of war the tasks are broken down into supporting tasks,
enabling tasks and further enabling tasks. A commander then selects from the whole
UJTL through an analysis of command guidance and his mission based on his forces, their
equipment and his area of responsibility. These selected tasks combine to form his
JMETL. The command assessment of the level of training on those tasks then provides a
tool to guide training.
Joint tasks describe the capabilities of our Armed Forces. They are assigned by
joint force commanders to be carried out by integrated Service components. Each task
then results in a condition and standard for performance; or in other words, a required
capability. They do not tell a commander how to accomplish that task (UJTL, 1-1).
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) has specifically laid out in his
annual guidance that commanders are responsible for training and that commanders assess
training. The development of a JMETL through the UJTL allows the commanders to
accomplish that guidance. "Developing a training program or scheduling an exercise
without a JMETL linkage may result in unfocused and often wasteful expenditure of
scarce resources, and should be viewed as lower priority" (CJCSI 3500.02, A-6). This
statement alone clearly and succinctly shows the importance of developing relevant
JMETLs and a methodology for training with them.
B. JOINT THEATER LEVEL SIMULATION (JTLS)
JTLS is an aggregated model that is a man-in-the-loop, multi-sided, joint (air, land,
sea, SOF) and combined constructive simulation model. This model simulates conflict at
the operational level of war with tactical fidelity. It can be utilized for both the planning of
contingency operations and in training support of Computer Aided Exercises (CAXs).
JTLS closely models modern coalition warfare through dynamic coalition development,
designation of political or military factions, setting Rules of Engagement, executing
Host-Nation Support agreements and conducting Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.
The most recent version of JTLS can be run on an open system for distribution across
multiple hardware platforms and has a graphical user interface (GUI) JTLS was initially
developed by Rolands and Associates of Monterey, California in 1982, and is still
maintained by them today
C. DEFINITION OF FORCE PROTECTION
Force protection is the combination of all the things that a commander can do to
conserve the fighting potential of a force. Force protection involves all actions that reduce
the probability and minimize the effects of enemy action on personnel, equipment and
critical facilities. It provides for the health, welfare, morale and maintenance of the force.
Protection ensures the safety of personnel and includes those measures that prevent
fratricide. (JP 3-0, IV-9).
Force protection involves careful and methodical planning that reduces or
eliminates risks. Commanders at all levels must conscientiously consider for all phases
which approach will result in better force protection. This can be done through passive
defensive measures such as careful placement of units and operations security measures
(OPSEC). These are low cost measures that can have a large payoff towards protecting
the force. In addition, a commander can enhance the protection of the force through
hardening of critical assets, providing additional defensive units whose mission it is to
protect specific assets, providing special equipment that augments the defensive posture
such as early warning devices and layering the defense through air defense units, close air
support or units in a screening or guarding mission.
The amount of force protection a commander provides to a force is a difficult
decision. Assets that are given a force protection role usually could have been used in
offensive operations. Determining the correct mix between defensive posturing that
allows a force to maintain its operational tempo and those forces dedicated to offensive
operations is complex. A commander must analyze the enemy threat and his own
vulnerabilities. Is the operational tempo allowing the commander to operate and execute
inside the enemy's decision cycle? If so, that itself is a force protection measure. If the
enemy is being successful in his operations against friendly forces, the command is then
more vulnerable and must increase its force protection measures. In any given situation a
commander has a continuous responsibility to evaluate the force protection requirements.
An increased threat forces a commander to increase his force protection to reduce his
risk.
D. DEFINITION OF CRITICAL ASSETS
Critical assets are any supplies, pieces of equipment or units with unique
capabilities that if lost or damaged, will cause the force to fail in its mission. They are
usually specifically identified in a commander's order. Examples of critical assets are jet or
helicopter fuel, command and control equipment, special munitions, Stinger missiles,
refugee collection points, ammunition supply points, communication nodes, aircraft
carriers, satellites, VTPs, airfields and aircraft hangers. Another way to view critical assets
is that they are mission essential elements of an operation.
E. DEFENSIVE MEASURES
As previously discussed, there are active and passive measures that a commander
can take to protect his force. This section covers some of the basic measures available to
a commander. Traditionally the biggest threats to a force have been the following:
1
.
The employment of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that include nuclear,
biological and chemical (NBC) weapons.
2. A threat from the air directed from fixed wing aircraft, helicopters, ballistic
missiles, very short range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) or low-observables.
3. A threat to the sustainment base and lines of communication from
unconventional forces, special operations forces or enemy units .
As the Armed Forces modernize, additional threats will come from electronic
interference, OPSEC being compromised through the media and the development of the
non-linear battlefield, coupled with dispersion causing fratricide and wider maneuver area
for enemy forces (Protect the Force, 2).
The centerpiece of force protection is warning. The intelligence system provides
to commanders an assessment of the current enemy situation that allows him to make a
decision on the force protection requirements If the threat from special forces is
nonexistent, the defensive posture in the rear areas of the battlefield will appear very
different than if the threat is high. Assessment of the capability will drive the allocation of
protection assets. This process takes place from pre-deployment through redeployment.
It has broad-reaching effects from the flow of forces to the arrayment of units on the
battlefield.
Another force protection measure is reducing enemy targeting effectiveness. This
ranges from physical camouflage that protects over a multi-spectral range to electronic
camouflage through high technology information operations. By not allowing the enemy
to see the force, he cannot interrupt the operational tempo.
The most conventional methods of force protection are reducing the effectiveness
of enemy action. This is accomplished through many different systems and units. The air
defense systems that cover an area of operation include the families of High-to-Medium
Altitude Air Defense (HTMAD), Theater High-altitude Area Defense System (THAAD)
and Short Range Area Air Defense (SHORAAD). Security forces that include infantry,
armor, attack helicopter or military police units provide additional layers of defense for
critical assets. Large ammunition supply points (ASPs), for example, are often protected
by an infantry unit that is enhanced by a military police unit on patrol near, along with an
on-call tactical combat force (TCF) that can respond to level III threats. More recent
developments in digitized communications also reduce the effectiveness of enemy action
by denying him information about friendly operations. Counterbattery fires, smart missiles
and smart artillery submunitions all force the enemy to slow through destruction of
equipment and forces or to redirect his movement and fire. Effectiveness can also be
reduced through pre-deployment immunizations that prevent or reduce biological and
chemical attack effects.
The enhancement of personnel, equipment and critical facility survivability allows
friendly assets to survive despite an enemy attack. Examples of this are equipment and
facilities that are hardened or equipped with anti-ballistics, units that are placed in optimal
geographic locations and soldiers that are given bullet and shrapnel proof clothing. It is
this type of force protection that reduces the probability of kill of an enemy system.
F. THESIS APPLICATION
This thesis considers specific areas of force protection. Methodology is presented
to determine how effectively additional ground forces are being used to protect critical
assets on the battlefield. The protection addressed is in terms of organic unit defense,
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additional ground forces on a specific protection mission, attack helicopters that are
on-call to those critical assets or to the additional ground forces, friendly field artillery
within range and AC- 130 gunships. It also considers the coverage of air defense
umbrellas at all three levels of protection.
m. METHODOLOGY- DESCRIPTIVE MEASURES DEVELOPMENT
This chapter relates in detail how the descriptive quantitative measures for force
protection were developed. This methodology closely follows the work that was done in
CPT Ray A. Comb's NPS thesis dealing with logistics. The basis for this methodology is
the task linkage of the UJTL. Tasks can be linked vertically or horizontally. Vertical
linkage connects tasks across the different levels of war and is along functional lines.
Horizontal linkage, or end-to-end linkage, involves those different tasks that must be
performed in close coordination with each other to achieve mission success.
The steps that are followed in this methodology are the development of a joint task
schematic, the relationship of issues to the performance data requirements or dendritic and
finally, resolving the required descriptive measures.
A. JOINT TASK SCHEMATIC
The issue of force protection covers all three levels of war and has horizontal
linkage to other tasks. Figure 1 shows these linkages for the two areas covered in this
thesis. Across the figure in purple are the different levels of war and the tasks covered.
Down the figure are the supporting and enabling tasks with Protect Forces and Means in
green and Aerospace and Missile Defense in blue. The vertical linkage to TA 5 is shown
in yellow. The colors show the vertical linkage of the tasks. The tasks at the bottom are
the functionally horizontal linkages. This chart does not attempt to show all possible
horizontal linkages within the area of force protection. Single digit numbers at each level
are joint tasks, two digit numbers are supporting tasks, three digit numbers are enabling
tasks and four digit numbers are further enabling tasks. The UJTL indexes are defined in
Appendix B.
Important to note in this task schematic are the relationships among tasks within a
functional area Moving left to right depicts the hierarchical relationships of the tasks
among the different levels of war.
This schematic was developed by searching through the UJTL with the JoinT-CAT
software to identify those different tasks that are related to force protection.

Each task was evaluated based on its description and chosen based on its doctrinal

















The dendritic is a tool that allows an issue to be defined in terms of data
requirements. It starts in the form of a question that branches out into issues and
sub-issues, and finally enables specific data requirements to be defined. The data can be
objective or subjective. Objective data provide for measurements while subjective data
help to define non-measurable factors. These data requirements then allow an analyst to
go into a model and extract the required data. The two dendritics in Figures 3 and 4 are
both derived from the issue, critical issues and sub issues stated in Figure 2. Figure 3
deals with air defense protection and Figure 4 deals with additional force protection
measures.




How well are the forces protected from the enemy's firepower and
maneuver?
2. How well is the health, welfare, morale, and maintenance of the force
being provided?
3. How well is the safety of the forces being provided?
4. How well is fratricide of the force being prevented?
Sub Issues:
1 Are critical assets under the protection of an air defense umbrella?
2. Are critical assets given an adequate level of ground protection?
3. Are critical assets within an adequate response time of the tactical
combat force (TCF)?
4. Can the operational commander afford this level of protection?
Figure 2. Dendritic for developing data requirements
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Sub Issue #1




What level ofADA protection can the critical assets provide itself?
2. What do additional levels ofADA protection add to the critical asset's
protection?
3. How much ADA protection does the critical asset have at any given time?
4. What are the requirements for ADA protection of the critical asset?
Data Requirements
1. Time.
2. Location of friendly ADA units by type (THAAD, HTMAD, SHORAAD).
3 Times that ADA units are providing coverage.
4. Time hostile aircraft and missiles are intercepted.
Figure 3 . Dendritic development for ADA protection
Sub Issue #2




What level of protection can the critical asset provide itself?
2. What do additional levels of protection add to the critical asset's protection?
3. How much protection does the critical asset have at any given time?
4 What are the requirements for protection of the critical asset?
Data Requirements
1 Time.
2 Operating capability of a critical asset.
3 Operating capability of enemy forces within striking distance.
4 Number of hits by type on a critical asset.
Figure 4. Dendretic development for ground protection
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C. DESCRIPTIVE MEASURES
To measure force protection, this thesis will use firepower scores and force ratios
as described in Aggregated Combat Modeling by Hartman, Parry, and Caldwell
Firepower scores are calculated by summing the combat power values for each system in




X, is the number of weapons of type i in the unit for i=l, 2, 3...n
S
1
is the score value representing combat power for each type i weapon
A ratio then can be used to compare attacking units to defending units in battle.
This force ratio gives a measure of relative combat power in the battle and is defined as:
"C"D__ FPI Attacker
FPlDefender
Firepower scores do have limitations that any user must be aware of when used in
aggregate attrition modeling. The most serious limitation is that the score is both linear
and additive. There is no marginal benefit or diminishing return for additional weapon
systems and no minimum requirement is established for battle. Because of the lack of
interaction between combat systems, no synergistic effects are represented. Finally, there
is no agreement on what firepower score values should be used. Because of this
subjectivity, the results of any analysis can be the source of wariness or doubt.
Given these shortfalls, however, firepower scores can give relative indications
about the strength of a unit, its combat effectiveness, and what it is capable of doing.
Another method of determining the firepower score value is to consider the capabilities of
the system and its value based on what it is capable of attriting. The score for a weapon is
then defined to be proportional to the total value for all the enemy systems it kills. This is
the basis of the Eigenvalue or Anti-Potential Potential (APP) Method.
JTLS does not use APP, but the firepower score values are based on the
observation of what a weapon could accomplish in a battle. JTLS uses one set of scores
for each unit, stored in a file called the Tactical Unit Prototype (TUP). JTLS uses 84
different TUP files. Any unit used in a simulation must be modeled as belonging to a
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TUP. JTLS uses FPIs for the calculation of a portion of unit strength. All attrition is
done by Lanchesterian attrition modeling.
D. SPREADSHEET ANALYSIS
To gather the data required for an after-action review, Rolands and Associates has
developed a set of files that can be used for postprocessing. These files contain the
various data requirements in ASCII format that have been generated in conjunction with
the UJTL assessment effort. They vary from engagement results, air tracking, logistical
supplies, strength, location, and a variety of other critical information. There are
checkpoints that are taken periodically during a simulation at which time the
postprocessing files are updated. Any time a change in status occurs, it is recorded in the
appropriate file.
The actual files used are the strength, location, air detection, combat systems and
logistical files. The contents in each file are described in the JTLS player's manual. The
files were reduced in size by either editing them through a program written for this thesis
with Borland* Turbo Pascal® for Windows™ version 1.5, Thinner, or by spreadsheet
manipulation in Lotus® 1-2-3® Release 5 for Windows™. For direct spreadsheet use, the
file is first imported using the ASCII filter and combined into the current worksheet. The
data are sorted and then cut to another spreadsheet for analysis. Depending on the length
of the checkpoint, commercial spreadsheets may not be able to import the post-processing
files directly, thus requiring the use of Thinner. Thinner requests the name or names of the
desired units and outputs an ASCII file with all the data from the post-processing file
applicable to the units of interest. The checkpoints during the simulation are taken every
twelve hours, and for the most part can be directly imported into the spreadsheet The
computer code for Thinner is given in Appendix C.
Thinner or sorting on each unit by time gives the spreadsheet the data from each
postprocessing file in chronological order. Three graphs were made for each critical asset
from the data Unit strength is graphed as a percentage of combat systems and logistical
stockage on-hand over those required over time The Firepower Score Graph is
calculated by multiplying the firepower index according to the TUP for that unit by the
number of systems on-hand and then summing over the combat systems
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E. SUMMARY
This thesis tracks those critical assets and units, examines their firepower scores
graphically, and compares them to any actual or potential threats. Viewed in light of a
force protection plan and the amount of risk a commander is willing to take, the
commander and staff is provided a picture of how well critical assets are being protected,
their effect on the main effort and how their protection or loss affects the outcome of the
battle. This dynamic score presented over time is the key to understanding the battle in
terms of critical asset protection and why that asset had an influence on the outcome of the





The Joint Theater Level Simulation uses SJJVISCPJPT to support the need for a
discrete event simulation. The advantage of a discrete event simulation is the ability to
model activities that have been identified as critical events. The key processes of a theater
level, air-land battle are most easily visualized as a collection of discrete events. Some of
these events can be identified as critical to the outcome of a battle. They occur at a
specific time and have the potential for changing the state of the systems. This
characteristic of the model then allows the gathering of the appropriate data for the
assessment of force protection.
Units are modeled as entities within the simulation. As previously discussed, each
unit is modeled using a Tactical Unit Prototype (TUP). The TUP identifies the equipment,
capabilities and supplies on-hand, given that a unit is at 100 percent strength. The unit can
be ordered into various tactical postures and assigned missions. The unit automatically
assumes certain postures such as defend or withdraw if pre-established thresholds in the
TUP are reached.
Given that force protection is not a combat mission unto itself, it is not something
that a unit can be ordered to do in JTLS. Instead, it is up to the player to properly decide
unit placement, posture, special operating forces alert status and other force protection
enhancements. In a given plan, force protection can be assessed at specific times using the
status of a unit based on its strength, combat systems on-hand and supplies on-hand. The
application of force protection principles, or the lack thereof, directly affects the levels of
these measures. Depending on the criticality of a given unit, the loss of operating
capability or supply can be linked directly or indirectly to a critical event in the battle. The
tracking of these measures aids in validating the methodology of linking UJTL tasks to
critical events and in doing so, gives the commander a better idea of not only what
happened in a battle, but why. Analysis of these measures provides new insights into the
impact of force protection on the force.
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B. SCENARIO DESCRIPTION
Four runs of the JTLS simulation were made to generate data for demonstration of
the methodology. There were two basic scenarios used for the four simulation runs. All
were set in the Southwest Asia theater of operations. The first scenario, named Heavy,
was similar to Desert Storm in that Iraq had invaded Kuwait and had operationally paused
in a defensive posture on both sides of the Saudi Arabian boarder. This scenario was
developed to demonstrate the difficulty in generating combat power and establishing a
tactical advantage. Iraq had displaced all Kuwaiti combat forces and was in control of the
theater. Their objective was to seize the Trans-Arab pipeline and control the flow of oil in
northern Saudi Arabia.
The second scenario, named Light, had a build-up of forces along the Iraq-Kuwait
boarder threatening Kuwait. US forces were flowing into Kuwait to prevent an attack. In
both scenarios, two branches (sets) were created where one (set 1) allowed unimpeded
flow of equipment and units into theater and in the other (set 2) of the same scenario, an
aerial attack on blue port operations hampered the flow. In all runs, the principles of force
protection remained the same. The primary difference was the operational availability of
additional force protection assets such as air defense artillery determined by when they
arrived in theater.
C. ANALYSIS OF FORCE PROTECTION
On the first day of the heavy scenario, the forces were arrayed as shown in Figure
5 At the 3.01 decimal day point, a Red air attack was successful in launching long range
missiles against targets at the VII (US) Corps Main Headquarters. In this case, even
though the unit had adequate ground and air protection, the air defense was unable to
prevent the attack due to the stand-off capabilities of the rockets. The unit's strength over
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Figure 6 VII Corps Combat Strength
When the unit was attacked, its combat strength immediately dropped, but its
combat effectiveness is masked since strength percentages also include the logistical
supplies. In this attack, only combat systems were hit. The graph in Figure 7 shows the
individual systems that make up the total firepower score. One of the unit's most
important assets, C3I, suffered a 75% loss. In this case the unit definitely would require
immediate re-supply of communications equipment and would have to pass its combat
mission to either the Corps Rear or Corps Tactical Headquarters.
By examining the firepower score, the decision maker is better able to understand
why a unit may or may not be able to function on a specified mission. Had the damage
from the rocket attack affected the trucks and small arms, the unit would be able to
continue its primary mission of command and control without being impeded. The main
force protection issue illustrated here is the lack of adequate THAAD coverage. The
inability to protect against long range missile attacks caused a significant interruption in
the headquarter's decision cycle and operation. Another force protection issue illustrated
by this example is that the unit remained in the same location for three days. With its
proximity to the enemy force, and the US not having the initial tactical advantage, the
headquarters probably should have been moved at least once during the operation
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Figure 7 VII Corps Firepower Scores
In another example of using firepower scores to evaluate the effectiveness of
force protection, the 1st Direct Support Battalion (UK) came under aerial rocket attack at
decimal day 0.96. Their unit strength and firepower scores are shown in Figures 8 and 9,
respectively. With minimal losses on combat systems, they were able to continue their
mission in support of the 1st Armor Division (UK). This support included movement up
to the boarder of Iraq and Kuwait to assist in the expulsion of the Iraqi forces. The unit
was able to provide direct support to its parent unit and did not come under further
hostile fire, even though the unit was within 20 kilometers of enemy forces. Through
proper land management, tactical location and defensive posture on the move, the unit











95 I i i ii i ii i i i i n i ii i ii i 1 1 i 1 1 ii ii
0.58 0.96 1.33 1.71 2.08 2.50 2.71 2.88
Decimal Day
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The final example of this methodology shows a unit's strength over time where
force protection was adequate. The 24th Marine Service and Supply Group (MSSG24)
during the light scenario was in support of the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) in
Kuwait. At decimal days 0.83 and 1.24, there were attempts by the Iraqi Air Force to
attack the MSSG24 with MIG attack aircraft. The unit was correctly located in relation
to the 24th MEU and was under the umbrella of Army air defense at all levels (HIMAD,
THAAD, AND SHORAAD). It was fully supplied and its strength was 100 percent for
the entire exercise because it was not interdicted by an attack nor its effectiveness
reduced because of combat losses. If there was any problem with the unit's performance,
it did not occur due to a lack of combat power or force protection. The unit's combat
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D. CONCLUSION
Force protection is a combat multiplier. By being able to see where weaknesses
exist and how they affect specific combat systems, leaders can better understand how
their force protection plans bear on the battle. This UJTL task is linked to all the others
in that the lack of critical assets can force maneuver units to be less effective or unable to
create the momentum necessary to gain the advantage to win the battle.
The next chapter discusses the conclusions of evaluating force protection and
provides recommendations for further development for the use of this product in the
context of an after action review.
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V. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
This thesis presents a methodology for evaluating the performance of force
protection functions during a computer aided exercise as they pertain to selected universal
joint tasks. It is not an attempt to assign value to a plan or the execution of one, but
rather presents a means of identifying critical events and provides insights to their causal
reasons during an exercise. By analyzing the components of what makes an event critical,
the training audience can realize the importance of an element of a mission plan.
Examining the unit's strength and its Total Firepower Score provides quantitative
descriptors of the unit's capabilities. Knowledge of what force protection measures were
in place or being used then indicates the impact of a unit on the battle's outcome.
The strengths of the methodology are that it is uncomplicated, easy to produce
and can be quickly understood by the training audience. Simple file manipulation and the
graphical output can all be done through commercial spreadsheet packages. Although the
model has only been tested in JTLS, it uses data that are readily available and easy to
obtain from most event step simulation models.
This method of task evaluation is only one portion of the analysis as to why a
mission succeeded or failed. The reader is highly encouraged to review the previous work
done by Combs and Towery on this topic, as well as the concurrent work being published
by five other NPS students. A complete listing of these theses is contained in Appendix
A.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The next level that the after-action products from these research efforts need to
move to is an integrated package. An after action review team should be able to take the
post-processing files from the simulation, select which graphical outputs they want, and
have them produced with little user action required. A graphical user interface (GUI) that
presents the different UJTL tasks and what after action review products are available
would allow causal reasons for critical events to be shown across several functional areas.
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At present, to create the product described in this thesis, an analyst must gather the
required simulation files, sort them, trim the excess data, and then manually create the
graph in a spreadsheet application. Automation of this function would dramatically
decrease the amount of time required to produce the product, freeing the after action
review team to examine more units and events in greater detail.
Another recommendation is that these methodologies be utilized in another
simulation other than JTLS. JTLS currently does not have the fidelity to implement with
precision all the force protection measures a unit could utilize. In a simulation that allows
different levels of defense, patrols, or rewards the use of terrain, a better picture of the
adequacy of the force protection plan could be seen.
Further development of this methodology could be tailored to meet individual
requirements established by a participating command. To conduct this development,
however, precise user requirements must be specified. The after action review products
from all of these theses need to be introduced to enhance upcoming exercises. By
involving the training audience that will ultimately be the beneficiary of these tools, the
products can be further refined to produce a complete package encompassing all the work
done to this point on UJTL linkage.
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APPENDIX A - LIST OF CONCURRENT THESES
Brown, Kevin P. Evaluating Operational Maneuver in a Computer Exercise
. Master's
Thesis, Operations Research Department, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA
1996.
Cwick, Mark. Analyzing Amphibious Logistics Capabilities in the Joint Theater Level
Simulation (JTLS). Master's Thesis, Operations Research Department, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 1996.
Gordon, Kerry. A Methodologyfor Evaluating the Performance of Operational
Firepower during a Computer Aided Exercise Master's Thesis, Operations Research
Department, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 1996.
Mustin, John B. Evaluating Carrier Battlegroup Anti-Air Warfare Capability in a
Computer Aided Exercise Master's Thesis, Operations Research Department, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 1996.
Sullivan, Mark. A Methodologyfor Evaluating A Joint Mobilization Plan Using the Joint
Theater Level Simulation (JTLS) Master's Thesis, Operations Research Department,
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 1996.
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APPENDIX B - UJTL INDEX DEFINITIONS
The following UJTL indexes are identified from Figure 1
Strategic National Level of War
Task Index Definition
3 Employ Forces
3.3 Protect Strategic Forces and Measures
3.3.3 Coordinate Worldwide Operations Security
3.3.6 Provide Security for Strategic Forces and Means
3.4.6 Provide Space Control
4.2.5 Provide Defensewide Base Operations Support
Strategic Theater Level of War
Task Index Definition
6 Provide Theater Protection
6.1 Provide Theater Aerospace and Missile Defense
6.1.4 Provide for Theater Air Defense
6.1.5 Provide Theater Missile Defense
6.2 Provide Protection for Theater Strategic Forces
and Means
6.2.5 Provide Security for Theater Forces and Means
6.2.5.2 Secure and Protect Theater Installations,
Facilities, and Systems
6.2.5.3 Secure and Protect Theater Air, Land, and Sea
LOCs
8.3.4 Obtain Multinational Support against Nonmilitary
Threats
8.4.2 Assist in Combating Terrorism
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Operational Level of War
Task Index Definition
6 Provide Operational Protection
6.1 Provide Operational Aerospace and Missile Defense
6.1.5 Conduct Operational Area Missile Defense
6.2 Provide Protection for Operational Forces, Means, and
Noncombatants
6.5 Provide Security for Operational Forces and Means
6.5.1 Provide Counterreconnaissance in Theater of
Operations/JOA
6.5.2 Protect and Secure Flanks, Rear Areas, and COMMZ in
Theater of Operations/JOA
6.5.3 Protect/Secure Operationally Critical Installations,
Facilities, and Systems
6.5.4 Protect and Secure Air, Land, and Sea LOCs in Theater
of Operations/JOA
6.5.5 Integrate Host-Nations Security Forces and Means
1.5.5 Assist Host-Nation in Populace and Resource Control
Tactical Level ofWar
Task Index Definition
6 Provide Mobility and Survivability
6.3 Enhance Survivability
6.3.1 Protect against Combat Area Hazards
6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems
5.5 Employ Tactical C2W
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APPENDIX C - PASCAL PROGRAM
The following program is the Turbo Pascal program code for the program Thinner.
The program contains its own documentation. This program can be easily adapted to
reduce the size of any JTLS post-processing file. The program requests the name of the
unit or units that are desired and the type of file. It then outputs an ASCII file that can be
imported into a spreadsheet.
Program Thinner;
{This program will take specific UJTL files listed below and remove
undesired data from the file and return the "thinned" file}
{Written by CPT John L. Thurman, USA, Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, CA 17 MAY 96






InfileName, OutfileName: string [25];
NumberOfUnits, i,TypeOfFile : integer;







NamesOfUnitsl : Array [1.MaxArraySize] of string [13];
begin
for i:=l to NumberOfUnits do
begin
writeln('What is the name of the number ',i,' unit to remain?');
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writeln('Ensure you have 13 characters and spaces EXACTLY as in the file.');
readln(NamesOfUnits 1 [i]);
end;
while (not SeekEOF(JTLSFile)) do
begin
read(JTLSFile,time,gl,UnitName,g2,cbtsys,g3,amount);
for k:=l to NumberOfUnits do
begin
ifNamesOfUnitsl[k] = UnitName then
begin


















for i:=l to NumberOfUnits do
begin
writelnfWhat is the name of the number ',i,' unit to remain?');
writelnfEnsure you have 26 characters and spaces EXACTLY as in the file.');
readln(NamesOfUnits2[i]);
end;
while (not SeekEOF(JTLSFile)) do
begin
read(JTLSFile,time,gl,Indicator l,UnitName,g2,Lat,g3,Long,g4,indicator2);
for k:=l to NumberOfUnits do
begin









writeln('What is the name of the input file? Include the drive.');
readln(InfileName);






writeln('How many units will remain?');
readln(NumberOfUnits);
















APPENDIX D - JTLS SAMPLE FILES
The following are samples cut from the post-processing output files from JTLS:
Strength
Decimal Day Unit Strength
1.5
|
1 | 1-227AVBN 99.93
1.5
|
1 | 1-AVBN101 99.93
1.5
1
1 | 1ARBDE1AR 99.63
1.5
| 1 | 1ARBDE1AR 305.71
1.5
| 1| 1ENBDE 99.36
1.5
|
1 | 1-9FABN 99.62
1.54
| 1 | 10SUPBN 99.77
1.54
|
1 | 1ARDIV.UK 97.89
1.54
|





Decimal Day Unit Combat System Amount
2 1DSBN TRUCKS-TANKE 9
2 1DSBN TRUCKS-CARGO 182
2.13 1DSBN TRUCKS-CARGO 182
2.13 1DSBN TRUCKS-TANKE 9
2.17 1DSBN UTILITY-TRK 23
2.33 1DSBN C3I 2
2.42 1DSBN C3I 2
2.33 1DSBN OTHER-TROOPS 714
2.04 1DSBN TRUCKS-CARGO 182
2.08 1DSBN OTHER-TROOPS 713
2.04 1DSBN C3I 2
2.08 1DSBN TRUCKS-TANKE 9
2.08 1DSBN TRUCKS-CARGO 182
2.38 1DSBN UTILITY-TRK 23
35
Posture
2| 1 | 1-11FABN DEFEND DEFEND
2
1
1 | 1-11FABN INACTIVE DEFEND
2| 1| 11FABDE18 DEFEND DEFEND
2| 1| 11FABDE18 INACTIVE DEFEND
1.5
|
1 | 1-227AVBN DEFEND DEFEND
1.5
|
1 | 1-227AVBN INACTIVE DEFEND
2| 1 | 1-229ATKH DEFEND DEFEND
2| 1 | 1-229ATKH INACTIVE DEFEND
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